In studying China's targeted poverty alleviation policy, this paper models the interaction between local governments and poor households with an evolutionary game. The model predicts that bolstering information access of rural residents can significantly improve the effectiveness of poverty alleviation. Using data from the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS) for 2015, we test this prediction by employing Internet use, TV-viewing and radio-listening as proxy variables of information access. OLS and probit regressions show significant positive effects of targeted people's information access on various measures of poverty alleviation success. Estimations through propensity score matching (PSM) yield similar results. The findings highlight the importance of information access in global poverty alleviation efforts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Eliminating poverty is a panhuman goal and aspiration [1] - [4] , which is also an important measure to improve human welfare and ensure economic sustainability. Many international organizations have been working to reduce the world's poor population numbers and incidences of poverty [5] - [7] . A growing body of studies have been conducted in an attempt to fully understand the definition and reality of poverty, and to find the most effective poverty reduction policies [8] - [16] . However, poverty alleviation research still has a long way to go.
As the most populous country in the world, China has made great progress in reducing the number of people living in poverty [7] . The numbers of rural poor in China decreased by nearly 67 million from 2010 to 2012 [17] . The United Nations
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Eunil Park . ''Millennium Development Goals Report 2015'' shows that the number of people living in extreme poverty in the world decreased from 1.9 billion in 1990, to 836 million in 2015. China's contribution rate in terms of this reduction was over 70% [18] . For a very long time, China's anti-poverty experience has been receiving attention from scholars all over the world [19] - [25] .
At the 19th Communist Party of China (CPC) National Congress, the Chinese government pointed out that ''Chinese society's principal contradiction has evolved to be that between unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's ever-growing need for a better life'' [26] . The report states that the Chinese government will continue to put poverty alleviation work at a new level for a new period of time. As a major government initiative, the targeted poverty alleviation policy has received extensive attention from academic researchers [7] , [27] . Poor households and poverty-stricken villages are the targets and the main body VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ of the targeted poverty alleviation policy. The local governments are the main coordinators, promoters and supervisors of targeted poverty alleviation work. However, the reality is that the levels of information awareness, voice and the right to dialogue between the poor households, villages and local governments are in a state of asymmetry with regard to the process of poverty alleviation. The poor households also belong to the vulnerable rural groups. The new strategy may form a system dominated by local governments, in which poor households are passive participants. In such cases, it is difficult to arouse the enthusiasm of the poor households to the point where they will actively participate in anti-poverty programs. This could eventually lead to a phenomenon whereby, ''in the end, local governments are trapped in passive poverty alleviation, and poor households are lifted out of poverty passively''. In this case, those targeted for poverty alleviation will fall into the ''prisoner's dilemma,'' negatively influencing the efficiency of the government's poverty alleviation work [28] , [29] . Specifically, this paper mainly attempts to solve the following practical problem: how do we make targeted poverty alleviation work more efficient in China? The current study attempts to use evolutionary game theory to depict the limited rational game relationship between poor households and local governments, in order to provide some policy implications for the targeted poverty alleviation work. Compared with existing literature, this paper makes two main contributions. First, to the best of our knowledge, the evolutionary game model is adopted for the first time, in order to dynamically analyze the strategy choices between local governments and poor households in the process of China's targeted poverty alleviation. We find that improve rural residents' ability to obtain information can significantly improve the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work. Secondly, based on data from the Chinese General Social Survey for 2015, this study empirically examines the effect of information access (to rural residents) on the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work. Also, OLS and probit estimation results show that improving information access capability to rural residents can significantly reduce the incidence of poverty for rural residents, which has important policy implications for China's targeted poverty alleviation work. In order to obtain a more reliable conclusion, we conducted two supplementary analyses. Firstly, we adopt the logarithm of per capita household income as the proxy of the efficiency of targeted poverty alleviation. Secondly, we employ propensity score matching (PSM) to deal with possible selective bias. Through these steps, the main conclusions remain consistent.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze how to make targeted poverty alleviation work more efficient in China. Section 4 builds an econometric model to fully examine the conclusion drawn from the evolutionary game analysis. Then, Section 5 summarizes the main conclusions and provides corresponding policy suggestions to China's targeted poverty alleviation.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW A. TARGETED POVERTY ALLEVIATION
A targeted poverty alleviation policy has become the core objective of China's new stage of poverty alleviation and development. In November 2013, China's General Secretary, XI Jinping, put forward ''targeted poverty alleviation'' for the first time. Investigations started in Xiangxi, Hunan province, after which many scholars paid constant and close attention to China's targeted poverty alleviation practices. The focus mainly includes the following aspects:
Firstly, some scholars mainly discussed the connotation of targeted poverty alleviation. Compared to previous measures, the current targeted poverty alleviation strategy requires more targeted efforts to eliminate the various factors affecting the poverty levels of poor households [7] . Li et al. [13] and Wang [30] pointed out that the targeted poverty alleviation strategy uses scientific and effective procedures to accurately identify, help and manage the poverty-stricken objects. The resulting strategy depends on the environment of the different poverty-stricken areas and the situation of different poverty-stricken farmers. Guo et al. [31] discussed the connotation of targeted poverty alleviation in China and believed that targeted poverty alleviation is an innovative poverty alleviation strategy, which contributes to overcome the island effect of poverty distribution and help policymakers to formulate targeted measures to efficiently improve the situation in China's rural areas.
Secondly, the problems and dilemmas faced by targeted poverty alleviation work is also important research topic in the field. Generally speaking, developing local industry is one of the most effective ways to achieve targeted poverty alleviation [7] . However, the problem of land supply has become an important factor hindering the promotion of industrial poverty alleviation in China. Meanwhile, Liu et al. [32] , Li et al. [33] , Lo et al. [34] , and Long et al. [35] all found that, with the rapid development of urbanization, a large number of young rural laborers enter into urban non-agricultural employment, while the older people remain in the rural areas. As a result, China's rural areas have experienced the unique phenomenon of simultaneous population hollowing and aging [7] . What's more, Zhou et al. [7] and Liu [36] point out that the problem of diseases in rural areas and insufficient funding of education pose a great challenge to poverty alleviation. These factors greatly increase the difficulty and cost for a poverty-stricken population, making it almost impossible to eliminate poverty. Other scholars point out that the current land policy and household registration regime have also shown great resistance to China's targeted poverty alleviation [6] , [37] .
Thirdly, another research direction mainly involves the summary of the experience for poverty alleviation in China [34] , [38] - [41] . Some scholars emphasized the importance of public consultation and more tailored policy support in targeted poverty alleviation. For example, Rogers et al. [42] suggested that without public participation, targeted poverty alleviation creates new tensions at the village level concerning who should be designated as poor and who should receive the benefits. Similarly, Lo et al. [43] held that everyone should be informed about the policies and be given the opportunity to provide feedback, such that the government can understand the challenges the poor must over-come in order to participate in poverty alleviation. Taking Hebei Province as an example, Huang and Yang [44] found that improving inclusive finance in poverty-stricken areas and promoting close cooperation between financial institutions and government departments played an important role in the efficiency of targeted poverty alleviation work.
B. EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
A game is a process in which strategies and behavior actions are chosen when facing certain environmental conditions and specific rules, either simultaneously or successively. The corresponding game results are then taken for some individual, team or organization, respectively. A game normally involves the following four aspects: 1) the game participants (players); 2) the strategies or actions of all participants can be chosen; 3) the order of the game, and 4) each player's payoff. As a branch of economics, game theory makes up for the difficulties found in microeconomics and macroeconomics, namely being able to analyze the mutual influences between multiple and individual decisions [45] . Traditional game theory is based on the complete rationality of game players. However, when a game player or decision-maker is in a complex social environment and faces a complicated decision, the rational choices of the decision-makers often have obvious limitations. In this case, it is difficult to use a traditional static game or comparative static game method for analysis purposes. In the 1970s, with the development of the evolution game theory, which is based on the principle of biology evolution, the complicated dynamic behaviors of game systems can now also be studied through game theory [46] - [49] . Evolution game theory combines game theory and dynamic evolution theory, breaking through the traditional game theory's strict requirements that all game players must be completely rational. An evolutionary game's attention is focused on the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), which expands the application space of game theory [50] , [51] . Essentially, ESS is a state of equilibrium, where agents that have different strategies are not constricted by unsatisfactory strategies [45] .
III. ANALYSIS OF THE STRATEGY CHOICES BETWEEN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND POOR HOUSEHOLDS BY USING EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY A. GAME MODEL HYPOTHESIS
There are complex game relationships among poor households (or poor villages), non-poor households (or non-poor villages), local governments and superior governments in China's targeted poverty alleviation work. This paper mainly focuses on the model of an evolutionary game between local governments and poor households. In the process of targeted poverty alleviation, both the poor households and local governments play important roles. Poor households are the accurate objects in poverty alleviation, and the local governments are the accurate coordinators, drivers and supervisors for poverty alleviation work. However, many information asymmetry situations exist between the poor households and the local governments in the process of poverty alleviation. The right to having a voice is also not equal between them. In many instances, the local government acts as a ''giver'', lacking the necessary support work and enthusiasm for antipoverty efforts from the poor household. On the other hand, due to the fact that local governments and the poor households experience many information asymmetry phenomena, the cost to local governments involved in poverty alleviation is large. Therefore, some local governments have negative attitudes regarding poverty alleviation. The result is that, even though a lot of money is poured into poverty alleviation funds, the incomes of poor households have not been significantly improved. Poor households are just passively involved in anti-poverty measures. In addition, due to the lack of proven scientifically-based anti-poverty methods, the costs and risks to poor households in anti-poverty strategies are bigger. Therefore, the poor households react negatively to anti-poverty strategies. This reaction, in turn, has serious negative effects on the targeted poverty alleviation. In order to construct an evolutionary game model between the poor households and local governments, the following hypotheses are made:
1) Under the condition of limited theory, the two participants in the game are: the local government and the poor household (set to 1 and 2, respectively). The local government and poor household are randomly selected and matched, respectively, from different members of the game. In order to find the optimal strategy, the game between the two sides happens through constant learning and adjustment of a repeated dynamic game, and eventually, equilibrium is reached. The adjustment process of the strategy choice can use a more general evolutionary game of replicator dynamic equations to simulate.
2) The local governments' policy options are included in S 1 (s 11 : actively participating in poverty alleviation, s 12 : negatively participating in poverty alleviation). The poor households' strategy options are included in S 2 (s 21 : active anti-poverty, s 22 : negative anti-poverty).
B. PAYOFF MATRIX
The payoff parameters of both local governments' strategy selections and poor households' strategy selections are set as follows:
1) Assume that the local government's poverty alleviation work for the poor household gains the effects for U (including economic, political and environmental effects, etc.). When the local government adopts a passive participation strategy for poverty alleviation, the local government will be punished by a superior government or public opinion for H , and the cost to local governments that choose the active participation strategy for poverty alleviation is D. Assume also that poverty alleviation cost D depends only on the information access capability to rural residents (F), and ∂D ∂F < 0. Generally speaking, with the improvement of farmers' information access ability, farmers can better understand the relevant poverty alleviation policies, so they can make better use of policies to achieve their own poverty alleviation. In addition, improving farmers' information acquisition ability can also help the government to popularize the policy of benefiting farmers in time, accurately assess farmers' living conditions to determine who is the real poor household, and give dynamic feedback to the whole process of poverty alleviation, so as to reduce the information asymmetry between poor households and local governments. In other words, the higher the information access ability for poor households, the lower the cost for local governments to actively participate in poverty alleviation work, and to guide or supervise the poor households' negative and lazy behavior for the anti-poverty strategy.
2) Assume that the pure income of the poverty household is W 1 before targeted poverty alleviation. After the poor household actively participates in the anti-poverty strategy, the pure income for the poverty-stricken household is W 2 .
3) The poor household gets a total amount of poverty funds for A. When the poor household chooses the strategy to negatively participate in the anti-poverty strategy, and the local government chooses to actively participate in the poverty alleviation strategy, the local government can observe the poor households' behavior and recover the poverty funds. The local government will then get rewards for W from superior government or public opinion by adopting this behavior. When the local governments observe the poor households' active behavior, the reward for W 3 will be given to the poor household for their active behavior.
4) The cost of choosing active anti-poverty for the poor household is B; B depends on the health and education level of the poor household, as well as macroeconomic conditions, such as industrial structures.
According to the above parameters, Table 1 has a 2×2 game yield matrix for the local government and poor household.
C. THE REPRODUCTION DYNAMIC PROCESS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE POOR HOUSEHOLD
Assuming that the probability of the local government choosing the active poverty alleviation strategy is x (0< x <1), Therefore, the probability of the local government using the passive poverty alleviation strategy is 1−x. The probability of the poor household choosing the positive anti-poverty strategy is y (0< y <1). Homoplastically, the probability of the poor household selecting the negative anti-poverty strategy is 1 − y. The finite rational repeated game process is simulated, based on the replication dynamic equation.
The expected benefits u 11 for the local government when selecting the active participation in the poverty alleviation strategy can be calculated as:
The expected benefits u 12 for the local government when selecting the negative participation in the poverty alleviation strategy can be calculated as:
The average benefitsū 1 for the local government can be calculated as:
The expected benefits u 21 for the poor household when selecting the active anti-poverty strategy can be calculated as:
The expected benefits u 22 for the poor household when selecting the negative anti-poverty strategy can be calculated as: The average benefitsū 2 of the poor household can be calculated as:
The dynamic analysis of the game between the local government and the poor household is carried out separately. The dynamic equation of the local government F(x) and the poor household F(y) can be obtained by:
According to the above replication dynamic equation, letting F(x) = 0 and F(y) = 0, and the five replication dynamic equilibrium points are obtained for (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1) and
The Jacobian matrix J of the above replication dynamic equation is as follows:
According to the above Jacobian matrix (9) , the determinant of the matrix (detJ ) and trace (trJ ) are respectively:
According to Friedman [42] , the equilibrium stability judgment method of a dynamic replication system is proposed: When detJ > 0, and trJ < 0, the corresponding equilibrium point is the system's stabilization strategy (ESS). Furthermore, at the equilibrium point (except for (x * , y * ) point), we have: detJ = dF(x) dx dF(y) dy , trJ = dF(x) dx + dF(y) dy . Therefore, the judgment conditions of whether an equilibrium point is the ESS are equal to: dF(x) dx < 0 and dF(y) dy < 0. From the results of the game, when the poor household using its endogenous power to choose the anti-poverty strategy is the optimal choice for society, this means the dynamic stability of the complex system point strategy is point (0, 1) or point (1, 1) . According to the above judgment method, considering that point (0, 1) is the final steady state strategy, the equilibrium point (0, 1) needs to satisfy the following requirements:
The stability of the other equilibrium point is given in Table 2 . At the same time, assuming that H is constant, W 1 + B is defined as the opportunity cost for the poverty household when selecting the active anti-poverty strategy. According to the above definition, W 2 is the pure income when poor households choose the active anti-poverty strategy. According to the results of Equation (12) and Table 2 , when the D is large, namely poor household has limited access to information, by making the W 2 > W 1 + B (making the future pure income of the poor household greater than the opportunity cost of adopting the active anti-poverty strategy) will the local government and the poor household adopt the negative poverty alleviation strategy and positive anti-poverty strategy, respectively. The equilibrium point (0, 1) will become the only dynamic complex system stable strategy (ESS), as shown in Fig. 1(a) . Similarly, when the equilibrium point (1, 1) is a stable strategy for the dynamic complex system, the conditions of satisfaction are shown in Table 3 , which also gives the stability of other equilibrium points. The equilibrium point (1, 1) needs to satisfy the following conditions:
Define W 2 + A + W 3 as the total income of the poor household after choosing the active anti-poverty strategy. The results show that, when D < H , namely poor household has a better information acquisition ability, as long as the total income (including government incentives, poverty alleviation funds and future income, etc.) of the poor household is greater than the opportunity cost of adopting the active anti-poverty strategy, the poverty-stricken household will develop the endogenous power to choose the positive anti-poverty strategy. Eventually, both the local government and the poor household will adopt the positive poverty alleviation strategy and positive anti-poverty strategy, respectively. In this case, the equilibrium point (1,1) will become the only dynamic complex system stable strategy (ESS), as shown in Fig. 1(b) .
The conclusions above suggest an important truth in the process of poverty alleviation. The local government is the coordinator, the agent and the supervisor of the poverty alleviation work, and the poor household is the main body of the poverty alleviation work. When poor household has limited access to information, in order to mobilize the poor households' internal, spontaneous enthusiasm to the proposed anti-poverty strategy, the government needs to ensure that the poor households' stable, future pure income is greater than the opportunity cost of anti-poverty behavior. Poverty alleviation work is difficult at this time. When poor household has a better information acquisition ability, if the government can ensure that the poverty households' stable, future total income level will be greater than the opportunity cost of anti-poverty behavior, the local government will choose to actively participate in the proposed poverty alleviation strategy, and the poor households will actively participate in the anti-poverty strategy. In this case, the poverty alleviation work can achieve effective and remarkable results.
Targeted poverty alleviation requires the joint efforts of local governments and poor households. As shown above, if poor household has limited access to information, this may eventually lead to a situation of negative poverty alleviation by the local government ( Fig. 1 (a) ). However, the poor households belong to a vulnerable group within society. If the poor households only rely on themselves to eliminate poverty, they would face numerous risks and uncertainties. What's more, poor households are also less able to withstand the associated risks, due to low education levels or health conditions. Therefore, it is necessary to constantly reduce the inadequacy of information between poverty-stricken households and local governments, so that both poor households and local governments can actively participate in targeted poverty alleviation, as shown in Fig. 1(b) .
By summarizing the above evolutionary game analysis, increasing the information access ability for poor households can encourage both local governments and poor households to actively participate in the targeted poverty alleviation work. Ultimately, the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work could be improved dramatically. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis:
Research hypothesis: there is a significant positive relationship between rural residents' information access ability and the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work.
Furthermore, this paper will employ the econometric model to test the above assumptions.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS A. DATA SOURCE
The data used in the empirical research of this section is from the China General Social Survey for 2015 (CGSS2015). CGSS has mainly been implemented by the Renmin University of China, starting in 2003. Each year, more than 10,000 household samples across the country are investigated. The CGSS2015 covers 28 provinces in mainland China (not including Hainan, Tibet, Xinjiang, Macau, Hong Kong and Taiwan), including 134 counties, and 487 neighborhood communities (villages). In each village or neighborhood community, about 25 families were randomly surveyed, and in each family, one person was randomly surveyed. In 2015, 10968 samples were surveyed, including 6470 city-dwelling samples and 4498 rural-dwelling samples. The respondents ranged from 18 to 95 years of age, so the data has a good representative mix. This study mainly uses rural-dwelling samples for research purposes.
B. ESTIMATION MODEL AND VARIABLE SETTINGS
Our empirical purpose is to test whether increasing the poor households' information access ability can improve the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work. Therefore, this study formulated the following regression model:
where subscripts i = 1, 2, . . . indexes the ith rural resident and ε i represents the error term. We use the probability of eliminating poverty for a rural resident as the measure of the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work. Therefore, the dependent variable probit (Y i ) represents the probability of eliminating poverty for rural resident i, which is equal to 1 when the rural resident i is not a poor household.
It is equal to 0 if the rural resident i is from a poor household.
Since the reform and opening up of the country's economy, China has adopted three different poverty standards, namely the ''1978 standard'', ''2008 standard'' and ''2010 standard''. This paper adopts the ''2010 standard'', which set the poverty line at 2300 yuan per person per year (at 2010 prices). We calculate the constant price in 2014 according to the annual consumer price index of rural residents and get 2610 yuan per person per year for the poverty line in 2014. Therefore, when the per capita household income of rural residents is greater than 2610 yuan, the probit (Y i ) is equal to 1; otherwise it is 0. The independent variables are asymmetry i and costk k,i , where asymmetry i is key variable concerned in this paper represents the information access ability of rural residents, and costk k,i is a set of variables representing the cost of poverty alleviation for the rural resident i. We use Internet use as a proxy variable to represent the information access ability of rural residents (denoted by Internet use). Many studies have shown that Internet plays an important role in improving government transparency and in improving relations between governments and citizens [52] - [54] . More and more governments are beginning to provide services to their citizens through information and communications technology [55] . In general, the use of the Internet can reduce the level of information asymmetry between rural residents and the government. Especially in recent years, with the development of mobile Internet technology, Internet access through mobile phones has been gradually popularized in China's rural areas and become an important way for rural residents to obtain information. However, considering that the Internet use rate of rural elderly population may be low, this paper further adopts the frequency of watching TV and receiving radio as two proxy variables to measure information access ability (denoted by TV-viewingand radio-listening). In particular, the Chinese government has implemented many policies to benefit farmers over the past decade, such as home appliances going to the countryside. As a result, almost all rural residents have access to television in China. The cost of poverty alleviation is mainly affected by certain factors, such as the human capital of rural residents and the regional industrial structure [46] - [63] . Therefore, we use the education degree, health status of rural residents, and the industrial structure of their provinces to reflect the cost of poverty alleviation.
In addition, X i is a set of control variables that may influence the probability of rural resident i falling into poverty. Those variables include gender, age, age squared, political identity, nationality, marital status and regional dummy variables. We removed samples with unclear or abnormal answers to related questions. Eventually, 4027 samples were obtained, including 3359 samples from non-poor households and 668 samples from poor households. Table 4 shows the detailed definitions and descriptive statistics of all variables.
C. ESTIMATED RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
Since the dependent variable (probit (Y i )) is a binary variable, the probit model is employed to estimate the benchmark model. However, as long as the model is set accurately, there is no absolute advantage or disadvantage between the results of ordinary least squares (OLS) and probit estimation [64] , [65] . Therefore, we report both the estimation results of OLS and probit estimation, and we use the robust standard error in all results.
As shown in Table 5 , the results under OLS and probit estimation are basically consistent, indicating that the estimation results in this paper are relatively stable. Model (1) and Model (5) only investigate the impact of information access ability on rural residents' probability of eliminating poverty. Model (2) and Model (6) only investigate the impact of the cost of poverty alleviation on the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty. Model (3) and Model (7) consider both information access ability and the cost of poverty alleviation factors. Model (4) and Model (8) add the control variables.
The results in Table 5 show that the coefficients of the three variables reflecting information access ability are positive in all models and pass the significance level of 1% except for receiving radio. The effect of receiving radio on the probability of eliminating poverty is not significant, which may be because television and the Internet have gradually replaced radio as the main access to information for rural residents. In general, the above results show that increase in the information access ability to rural residents can significantly increase the probability of eliminating poverty among rural residents. Therefore, the research hypothesis in this study is verified.
Compared to rural residents without education, rural residents with secondary school education, and those with education above university level, have a greater chance of eliminating poverty. Furthermore, with the improvement in the health level of rural residents, their probability of eliminating poverty will increase significantly. Finally, the industrial structure of each province is closely related to the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty. With the increase in the proportion of non-agricultural industries in the total economic output of various provinces, the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty is greater. According to the analysis above, an improvement in education level, improvement of health conditions and an increase in the proportion of non-agricultural industries in various regions are closely related to the cost of poverty alleviation for rural residents. Therefore, reducing the cost of poverty alleviation for rural residents can also significantly improve the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work.
Generally speaking, rural residents' income is the most direct reflection of poverty alleviation work efficiency. Therefore, we further tested the robustness with the logarithm of per capita household income as the dependent variable. The estimation results using OLS are shown in Table 6 . It can be seen that the empirical results in Table 6 are basically consistent with the foregoing, so the main conclusions are reliable.
In addition, we use Internet use as a proxy variable for information access ability to rural residents. However, there may be a selective bias between Internet use and the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty. For example, residents with higher income levels are more likely to use the Internet. Therefore, we further adopt the propensity score matching (PSM) to correct the possible selective bias for the Internet use variable. Three matching methods, namely 2-nearest neighbor matching, kernel matching and local linear regression matching are adopted in this study, respectively. The results are shown in Table 7 . As can be seen, after using PSM to deal with possible selective bias, Internet use can still improve the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty and increasing their income. Therefore, the empirical results of this paper are reliable. Summarizing the above empirical results, the theoretical hypotheses has been verified effectively, namely increasing information access ability to rural residents can significantly increase the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty. Therefore, the results of the above evolutionary game are further verified.
V. RESEARCH CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
China's targeted poverty alleviation work has made outstanding contributions to global poverty reduction and has attracted worldwide attention. This study was conducted in order to analyze how to make targeted poverty alleviation work more efficient. Based on the bounded rationality game theory, this paper used the evolutionary game to dynamically analyze strategy choices between local governments and poor households in the process of China's targeted poverty alleviation work. The main conclusion of this study is that, when poor household has limited access to information, it is difficult to mobilize the enthusiasm of poor households and local governments to participate in poverty alleviation at the same time. Poverty alleviation work is difficult to undertake at this time. When poor household has a better information access ability, it can achieve a more ideal situation that both poor households and local governments can actively participate in targeted poverty alleviation. In this case, the poverty alleviation work will achieve effective and remarkable results.
The poor households belong to a vulnerable group within society. What's more, poor households are less able to withstand risks, due to low education levels or health conditions. If poor households can only rely on themselves to eliminate poverty, they will face numerous risks and uncertainties. Therefore, it is necessary for both local governments and poor households to actively participate in China's targeted poverty alleviation work. Analysis of the evolutionary game shows that increasing information access ability to rural residents can encourage both local governments and poor households to actively participate in the targeted poverty alleviation work, thereby improving the efficiency of that targeted poverty alleviation work.
Finally, we use the CGSS in 2015 to examine the effect of information access ability to rural residents on the efficiency of China's targeted poverty alleviation work. We use the probability of rural residents eliminating poverty as the dependent variable and find that increasing information access ability for the rural resident can markedly reduce the incidence of poverty for rural residents. The empirical results are consistent with the evolutionary game conclusions. Based on these conclusions, several important policy implications could be derived, as follows:
Firstly, as China's economic development has entered the ''new normal'', all types of economic activity (in terms of China's poverty alleviation work) is also in a state of dynamic change. The poverty alleviation work should fully arouse the internal, spontaneous enthusiasm of poor households to choose and engage in the anti-poverty strategy. All regions should constantly cultivate their own economies, industrial structures and ''characteristic industries''. Secondly, information and communication technology (such as big data) should be used to promote the information symmetry between the participating subjects in the process of targeted poverty alleviation work. Traditional methods of poverty alleviation find it difficult to solve the information asymmetry problem between each of the main bodies participating in the process of poverty alleviation. This makes it difficult to accurately substantiate poverty alleviation results. At the same time, big data technology can be used to dynamically track the demand situation of poor households and the allocation of poverty alleviation resources, as well as to improve the fairness and transparency of poverty alleviation work. Thirdly, China should continue to expand education resource input in poverty-stricken areas. Efforts should be made to enhance vocational, technical, and modern agricultural technology training for the poor households. Education has always been one of the basic driving forces behind poverty alleviation work. Education can promote the individual comprehensive quality of the poor households, promoting their mastery of anti-poverty and the ability to become richer, even cutting off the intergenerational transmission of poverty. China should improve rural school conditions and reduce the gap between urban and rural education resources. In addition, more attention should be paid to cultivating skilled talents and to enhancing the endogenous power of poor people to get out of poverty and to become richer. Fourthly, China should set up a sound security mechanism of guarantees for povertystricken households to alleviate poverty and to improve the cooperative poverty alleviation model between government, market and society. Poor households are one of the most disadvantaged groups in society, and anti-poverty actions have many factors of uncertainty. Governments should formulate risk prevention and compensation mechanisms and attempt to reduce the risks attached to poor households' employment and entrepreneurship. Other objectives should include making full use of each main body's advantages in the market, continuously injecting vitality into poverty alleviation work. Moreover, China should establish a platform for the exchange of market services and promote poor households closely linked with the external market.
It is often difficult to use empirical evidence to verify the conclusions of game theory in a study. In addition, due to data limitations, the theoretical part of our paper is not perfectly connected to the empirical part. In spite of this, we have still tried to verify the theoretical part of the paper, and the relevant results also tested the theory to some extent. From this point of view, this paper still has some theoretical and practical value. However, these limitations also give us some direction for future research.
